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Abstract
In this paper, we present several classes of authentication codes using functions with per-
fect nonlinearity and optimum nonlinearity. Some of the authentication codes are optimal. On
the other hand, these authentication codes are easy to implement due to their simple algebraic
structures. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Authentication codes were invented in 1974 by Gilbert et al. [11]. Simmons [27] has
developed the theory of unconditional authentication analogous with Shannon’s theory
of unconditional secrecy [26]. During the last two decades, many authors have studied
authentication codes (see [28] for a survey).
In the model of authentication theory described by Simmons [27], there are three
participants: a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter wants to send
some information to the receiver through a public channel which is subject to active
attack, while the opponent wants to deceive the receiver. The opponent can either
impersonate the transmitter, causing the receiver to accept a fraudulent message as
authentic, or modify a message which has been sent by the transmitter. These attacks
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are called the impersonation and substitution attack, respectively. To protect against
these attacks, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key, which is used in an
authentication code. In Simmons’ model there is only one receiver. For multireceiver
authentication codes, the reader is referred to Desmedt et al. [8], Kurosawa and Obana
[19], Safavi-Naini and Wang [24,25]. In this paper we consider only the model with
one receiver described above.
A systematic Cartesian authentication code (or authentication code without secrecy)
is a code in which the source state (i.e., the plaintext) is concatenated with an authen-
ticator (also called tag) to obtain a message which is sent via a channel. Such a code
is a four-tuple (S;E;T; f), where S is the set of source states, E is the set of keys,
and T is the set of authenticators, and f :S×E→T is the authentication mapping.
The message space M=S×T is the set of all possible messages.
Each function f(·; e) is called an encoding rule. When the transmitter wants to send
the information s∈S using a key e∈E, which is secretly shared with the receiver, he
transmits the message m=(s; t), where t=f(s; e)∈T is the tag (authenticator). When
the receiver receives the message m=(s; t), he checks the authenticity by verifying
whether t=f(s; e) or not, using the secret key e∈E. If the equality holds, the message
is regarded as authentic and is accepted. Otherwise, the message is rejected.
One problem in the construction of authentication codes is to minimize the value
max{Pd0 ; Pd1} when the number of encoding rules (keys) and the number of tags are
@xed, where Pd0 and Pd1 are the probability of success with respect to the impersonation
and substitution attacks, respectively. Another problem is to minimize the number of
encoding rules (keys) and the number of tags when the value max{Pd0 ; Pd1} is @xed. It
is known that Pd1¿Pd0 for Cartesian authentication codes [30]. So max{Pd0 ; Pd1}=Pd1 .
However, we prefer to use max{Pd0 ; Pd1} instead of Pd1 .
In this paper, we construct two kinds of systematic Cartesian authentication codes
by applying functions with high nonlinearity. Some of them are optimal. The algebraic
structures and expressions of these codes are simple, and thus the authentication codes
can be implemented easily. Functions with high nonlinearity were originally used to
construct S-boxes for block ciphers and keystream generators for stream ciphers. In
this work, we have demonstrated their applications in constructing good authentication
codes.
2. The rst construction
In this section, we construct Cartesian authentication codes in which the number
of keys (encoding rules) is equal to the number of source states. We would like to
construct such authentication codes with minimum max{Pd0 ; Pd1}. For this purpose, we
use perfect nonlinear mappings.
2.1. The general construction
In this subsection, we describe the @rst general construction of authentication codes
without secrecy. Speci@c classes of such authentication codes will be given in later
subsections.
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Our authentication code is a four-tuple
(S;E;T; f); (1)
as described in Section 1. In our construction, we associate each of S and T with
an operation + such that (S;+) and (T;+) are @nite abelian groups. We also set
E=S. So the number of source states is equal to the number of keys. We assume that
there is a probability distribution on both the source state space and the key space.
In our construction, the keys and the source states are equiprobable (i.e., uniformly
distributed). Let v= |S| and u= |T|. For the construction, we need a mapping F
from (S;+) to (T;+).
We de@ne our authentication mapping f(s; e) as
f(s; e) = F(s+ e);
where e is any chosen key and s∈S is any source state.
Lemma 1. The message space M=S×F(S)⊆S×T, and thus the number of
possible messages is v|F(S)|. Also the probability Pr((s; t)) of a message (s; t)∈S×
F(S) being used is given by
Pr((s; t)) =
|F−1(t)|
v2
;
where F−1(t) denotes the set of preimages of t.
Proof. Since F is an onto mapping from S to F(S), for any (s; t)∈S×F(S), there
is an s′∈S such that F(s′)= t. Set e= s′ − s∈E, then we have f(s; e)=F(s + e)
=F(s′)= t. Hence (s; t) is a possible message. This proves that S×F(S) is the
message space.
Note that e and s are equiprobable. When both e and s range over S=E; t=(s; F
(s + e)) takes on (s′; t′)∈S×F(S) exactly F−1(t′) times. Hence, Pr((s′; t′))=
|F−1(t′)|=v2.
To calculate the probability Pd0 of a successful impersonation attack and the prob-
ability Pd1 of a successful substitution attack, we need to make the assumption about
what the opponent is supposed to know. Following standard practice, we assume that
the opponent knows the whole authentication system except the key e (equivalently,
the encoding rule), which is secretly shared between the transmitter and the receiver.
Theorem 2. Let (S;+) and (T;+) be abelian groups of orders v and u respec-
tively, and let F be a mapping from S to T. Then for the authentication code
(S;E;M;T; f) of (1) de7ned above, we have
Pd0 = max
t′∈T
|F−1(t′)|
v
;
Pd1 = max
s∈S;t∈F(S)
max
s′ =s;t′
|(F−1(t)− s) ∩ (F−1(t′)− s′)|
|F−1(t)| :
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Proof. In an impersonation attack, the opponent wants to generate a new message
m′=(s′; t′) by randomly choosing a source state s′ and an e′∈E and computing
t′=F(s′ + e′). The new message m′ is then inserted into the channel. This attack
is successful if and only if F(s′ + e)= t′. We now need to compute the proba-
bility Pr(F(s′ + e)= t′). Note that the keys and source states are equiprobable.
We have
Pd0 = maxs′ ;t′
|{e ∈ E : t′ = f(s′; e)}|
|{e ∈ E}|
=max
s′ ;t′
|F−1(t′)− s′|
|E|
=max
t′∈T
|F−1(t′)|
v
:
In a substitution attack, the opponent observed a message m=(s; t) and replaces it
with another message m′=(s′; t′), where s = s′. Since the keys and source states are
equiprobable, the probability of success of the substitution attack is
Pd1 = max
s∈S;t∈F(S)
max
s′ =s;t′
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e); t′ = f(s′; e)}|
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}|
= max
s∈S;t∈F(S)
max
s′ =s;t′
|(F−1(t)− s) ∩ (F−1(t′)− s′)|
|F−1(t)| :
2.2. Perfect nonlinear mappings
Let (A;+) and (B;+) be abelian groups of order n and m, respectively, and let f
be a function from A to B. One measure of nonlinearity of f is de@ned by
Pf = max
0=a∈A
max
b∈B
Pr(f(x + a)− f(x) = b); (2)
where Pr(E) denotes the probability of the occurrence of the event E. Functions with
high nonlinearity can be used to construct S-boxes for block ciphers and keystream
generators for stream ciphers [6].
Lemma 3. Let f be a function from (A;+) to (B;+). Then
Pf = max
0=a∈A
max
b∈B
(∑
y∈B |Cy ∩ (Cy+b − a)|
|A|
)
;
where Cy :=f−1(y)= {x∈A : f(x)=y}.
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Proof. Note that
|{x ∈ A |f(x + a)− f(x) = b}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃y∈B {x ∈ A |f(x) = y and f(x + a) = y + b}
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃y∈B (Cy ∩ (Cy+b − a))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
y∈B
|Cy ∩ (Cy+b − a)|:
The conclusion then follows.
It is easy to see that∑
b∈B
∑
y∈B
|Cy ∩ (Cy+b − a)| = |A|:
It then follows from Lemma 3 and the equation above that
Pf ¿
1
|B| : (3)
This is the lower bound for the nonlinearity of a function from A to B. The smaller
the value of Pf, the higher the nonlinearity of f. For applications in coding theory and
cryptography we wish to @nd functions with the smallest possible Pf. We say that f
has perfect nonlinearity if Pf =1=m. If f has perfect nonlinearity, then by de@nition
Pr(f(x + a)− f(x)= b)= 1=m for any @xed nonzero a∈A, i.e., f(x + a)− f(x) is a
balanced function for every @xed nonzero a.
When p is odd, we have the following three classes of perfect nonlinear mappings
from GF(qm) to itself [5,14].
Lemma 4. The power function xs from GF(pm) to GF(pm), where p is odd, has
perfect nonlinearity Pf =1=pm for the following s:
• s=2,
• s=pk + 1, where m=gcd(m; k) is odd,
• s=(3k + 1)=2, where p=3; k is odd, and gcd(m; k)= 1.
Lemma 5. De7ne f(x)=TrGF(pm)=GF(ph)(xs), where m and h are integers with h|m;
p is an odd prime, and TrGF(pm)=GF(ph) is the trace function. If
• s=2, or
• s=pk + 1, where m=gcd(m; k) is odd, or
• s=(3k + 1)=2, where p=3; k is odd, and gcd(m; k)= 1,
then f(x) is a function from GF(pm) to GF(ph) with perfect nonlinearity.
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There are several classes of functions from GF(q)2t to GF(q) with perfect nonlin-
earity. When q=2, they are in fact the bent functions [4,23]. The class of functions
described in Lemma 6 is a simple example.
Lemma 6. De7ne the function f(x) from GF(q)2t to GF(q) as
f(x1; x2; : : : ; x2t) = x1x2 + x3x4 + · · ·+ x2t−1x2t :
Then f has perfect nonlinearity.
There are some functions from Zp2 to Zp with perfect nonlinearity.
Lemma 7. De7ne f :Zp2 →Zp by f(i + jp)= ijmodp for 06i; j6p − 1. Then f
has perfect nonlinearity with respect to (Zp2 ;+) and (Zp;+).
Lemma 8. Let f :Zp2 →Zp be a mapping whose restriction to Z∗p2 is a surjective
homomorphism with respect to (Z∗p2 ; ·) and (Zp;+) and is zero otherwise. Then f
has perfect nonlinearity with respect to (Zp2 ;+) and (Zp;+).
The conclusions of Lemmas 7 and 8 are the function version of a result about
generalized Hadamard matrices due to de Launey [7] and Brock [3], respectively. We
now give one speci@c function of the type of Lemma 8.
Example 1. Let p be an odd prime, and let  be a primitive root modulo p2. De@ne
f as
f(x) =
{
h (modp) if x = h for some h;
0 otherwise:
Then f satis@es the conditions of Lemma 8 and therefore has perfect nonlinearity.
2.3. The 7rst kind of authentication codes from perfect nonlinear mappings
In this section, we describe several classes of authentication codes constructed from
perfect nonlinear mappings. We shall use the general construction given in Section 2.1.
To this end, we need to describe the components (S;+); (E;+); (T;+), and the
function F .
De@ne the function F(x1; : : : ; xn) from GF(q)n to GF(q) as
F(x1; : : : ; xn) = x21 + x
2
2 + · · ·+ x2n; (4)
where q is odd. It is easy to show that F has perfect nonlinearity. We now use this
function to construct a class of authentication codes, and only the case n being even
is considered. The following two lemmas are needed [20, pp. 282–283]:
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Lemma 9. Let n be even and let q be odd. Then for any b∈GF(q) the number of
solutions of the equation F(x1; : : : ; xn)= b in GF(q)n is
qn−1 + (b)q(n−2)=2 ((−1)n=2);
where  is the quadratic character of GF(q) and the function (x) is de7ned by
(x)= − 1 for any nonzero element x of GF(q) and (0)= q− 1.
Lemma 10. Let n and q both be odd integers, and let g(x1; : : : ; xn) be a nondegenerate
quadratic form over GF(q). Then for any b∈GF(q) the number of solutions of the
equation g(x1; : : : ; xn)= b in GF(q)n is
qn−1 + q(n−1)=2 ((−1)(n−1)=2b");
where  is the quadratic character of GF(q) and "=det(g) is the determinant of g.
Theorem 11. Let (S;+)= (E;+)= (GF(q)n;+), and (T;+)= (GF(q);+), where n is
even. Set F to be the function of (4). Then for the authentication code (S;E;T; f)
of (1), we have
|S| = qn; |E| = qn; |T| = q
and
Pd0 =


1
q
+
q− 1
q(n+2)=2
;
n
2
≡ 0 (mod 2);
1
q
+
q− 1
q(n+2)=2
;
n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 1 (mod 4);
1
q
+
1
q(n+2)=2
;
n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 3 (mod 4);
Pd1 6


1
q
+
q+ 1
q(n+2)=2 − q ;
n
2
≡ 0 (mod 2);
1
q
+
q+ 1
q(n+2)=2 − q ;
n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 1 (mod 4);
1
q
+
2q− 1
q(n+2)=2 − (q− 1)q ;
n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 3 (mod 4):
Proof. Note that −1 is a quadratic residue if and only if q≡ 1 (mod 4). Then the
formula for Pd0 follows from Lemma 9 and Theorem 2. We now consider Pd1 . It is hard
to determine the exact value of Pd1 . But we can give a very tight upper bound on Pd1 .
To this end, we need to consider |F−1(t)∩ (F−1(t′) + h)|, where h=(h1; : : : ; hn) =0.
Clearly x∈F−1(t)∩ (F−1(t′) + h) if and only if
F(x) = t and F(x − h) = t′
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which is equivalent to
h1x1 + h2x2 + · · ·+ hnxn = (t − t′ + h21 + h22 + · · ·+ h2n)=2;
x21 + x
2
2 + · · ·+ x2n = t: (5)
Since h=(h1; : : : ; hn) =0, at least one of these hi’s is nonzero. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that hn =0. Then by (5), x is a solution of a quadratic form
G(x1; x2; : : : ; xn−1)= a, and
G(x1; : : : ; xn−1) = x21 + · · ·+ x2n−1 + (h−1n h1x1 + · · ·+ h−1n hn−1xn−1)2
− 2h−1n b(h−1n h1x1 + · · ·+ h−1n hn−1xn−1);
where b=(t − t′ + h21 + h22 + · · · + h2n)=2 and a= t − b2. Note that the quadratic
form G(x1; : : : ; xn−1) may be degenerate. But by Lemma 10, the equation G(x1; x2; : : : ;
xn−1)= a has at most qn−2 + q(n−2)=2 solutions. Hence
max
t;t′ ;h =0
|F−1(t) ∩ (F−1(t′) + h)|6 qn−2 + q(n−2)=2: (6)
On the other hand, by Lemma 9 we have
min
t
|F−1(t)| =


qn−1 − q(n−2)=2; n
2
≡ 0 (mod 2);
qn−1 − q(n−2)=2; n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 1 (mod 4);
qn−1 − (q− 1)q(n−2)=2; n
2
≡ 1 (mod 2); q ≡ 3 (mod 4):
(7)
Combining (6), (7) and Theorem 2, the upper bounds for Pd1 can be obtained. The
remaining conclusions are obvious.
For authentication codes obtained from bent functions we can compute the exact
values of both Pd0 and Pd1 . We present the following proposition, but omit its proof.
Proposition 12. Let (S;+)= (E;+)= (GF(2)n;+), and (T;+)= (GF(2);+), where
n is even. Choose F to be a bent function from GF(2)n to GF(2). Then for the
authentication code (S;E;T; f) of (1), we have
|S| = 2n; |E| = 2n; |T| = 2
and
Pd0 =
1
2
+
1
2(n+2)=2
; Pd1 =
1
2
+
1
2(n+2)=2 − 2 :
2.4. The 7rst kind of authentication codes from functions with optimal nonlinearity
Let (G;+) be a @nite abelian group of order v and let D be a k-subset of G. The set
D is called a (v; k; %) diJerence set of G if the diJerence function dD(y)= |(D+y)∩D|
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takes on each nonzero element of G exactly % times when y ranges over all the nonzero
elements of G.
Certain diJerence sets can be used to construct functions with optimal nonlinearity.
Let (A;+) be an abelian group of order n≡ 3 (mod 4), and let D be an (n; (n− 1)=2;
(n− 3)=4)diJerence set of A. Such a set D is called a Paley–Hadamard diJerence set.
De@ne a function F from A to GF(2) by
F(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ D;
0 otherwise:
(8)
It can be shown that F has optimal nonlinearity PF =1=2 + 1=2n. We now apply this
type of functions to construct authentication codes.
Theorem 13. Let (S;+)= (E;+)= (A;+), and let (T;+)= (GF(2);+), where A is
an abelian group having a Paley–Hadamard di<erence set. Let F be the function
de7ned by (8). Then for the authentication code (S;E;T; f) of (1), we have
Pd0 =
1
2
+
1
2n
; Pd1 =
1
2
+
1
n− 1 :
Proof. Since F−1(1)=D is an (n; (n − 1)=2; (n − 3)=4) diJerence set, F−1(0) is an
(n; (n+ 1)=2; (n+ 1)=4) diJerence set. It can be computed that
|F−1(t) ∩ (F−1(t′) + a)|
|F−1(t)| =


n− 3
2(n− 1) if (t; t
′) = (1; 1);
1
2
if (t; t′) = (0; 0);
1
2
if (t; t′) = (0; 1);
n+ 1
2(n− 1) if (t; t
′) = (1; 0);
where a =0. The conclusions then follow from Theorem 2.
Theorem 13 gives quite a number of classes of authentication codes, as there are
many known Paley–Hadamard diJerence sets. Paley–Hadamard diJerence sets include
the following classes [17]:
(1) with parameters (2t − 1; 2t−1 − 1; 2t−2 − 1);
(2) with parameters (n; (n− 1)=2; (n− 3)=4), where n= q(q+2) and both q and q+2
are prime powers. These are generalizations of the twin-prime diJerence sets, and
may be de@ned as
{(g; h) ∈ GF(q)× GF(q+ 2) : g; h = 0 and &(g)&(h) = 1}
∪ {(g; 0) : g ∈ GF(q)};
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where &(x)= +1 if x is a nonzero square in the corresponding @eld, and &(x)=−1
otherwise;
(3) with parameters (n; (n− 1)=2; (n− 3)=4), where n= q is a prime power congruent
to 3 (mod 4). They are Paley diJerence sets and just consist of all the squares in
GF(q)∗;
(4) with parameters (n; (n−1)=2; (n−3)=4), where n= q is a prime power of the form
q=4s2 + 27. They are cyclotomic diJerence sets and can be described as
D = D(6;q)0 ∪ D(6;q)1 ∪ D(6;q)3 ;
where D(6; q)0 denotes the multiplicative group generated by 
6; D(6; q)i = 
iD(6; q)0
denotes the cosets, and  is a primitive element of GF(q).
New families of Paley–Hadamard diJerence sets give naturally new authentication
codes.
3. The second construction
In this section, we give another kind of construction of authentication codes based
on optimal nonlinear functions. Some of them are optimal.
3.1. The general construction
For authentication codes without secrecy, Stinson [30] proved the following:
Theorem 14. In any authentication code without secrecy in which Pd0 =Pd1 =w=v
=1=u, where u; w, and v are, respectively, the number of possible tags, the num-
ber of possible source states and the number of possible messages, we have that the
number of keys (encoding rules) b satis7es
(i) b¿u2 if w6u + 1, with equality occurring if and only if the authentication
matrix is an orthogonal array OA(u; w; 1) and the authentication rules are used
with equal probability;
(ii) b¿w(u − 1) + 1 if w¿u + 1, with equality occurring if and only if the authen-
tication matrix is an orthogonal array OA(u; w; %), where %=(w(u− 1) + 1)=u2,
and the authentication rules are used with equal probability.
We say that the authentication code is optimal if the equality b= u2 in the case w6u+1
(respectively, b=w(u − 1) + 1 in the case w¿u + 1) holds. In this section, we use
perfect nonlinear mappings to construct good authentication codes, of which some are
optimal.
Let F be a mapping from A to B, where (A;+) and (B;+) are @nite abelian groups.
We now de@ne the authentication code
(S;E;T; f); (9)
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where the set of source states is (S;+)= (A;+), the set of keys (E;+)= (A×B;+),
the tag space is (T;+)= (B;+), and the authentication mapping f from S×E to T
is de@ned by
f(s; (ea; eb)) = F(s+ ea) + eb; (ea; eb) ∈ A× B:
In the construction here, all keys and all state sources are equally distributed. Hence
in this construction, the number of keys (encoding rules) is equal to that of messages,
while in our @rst construction presented in Section 2.4 the number of keys (encoding
rules) is much smaller than that of messages. This is one diJerence between the two
constructions.
Theorem 15. Let F be a perfect nonlinear mapping from (A;+) to (B;+). Then for
the authentication code of (9), the deception probabilities are given by
Pd0 = Pd1 =
1
|B| :
Proof. Let s be a @xed constant, and consider f(s; e)=F(s + ea) + eb as a function
of e=(ea; eb). Clearly f(s; e) is balanced. Hence
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}| = |A| (10)
for each t∈T. It follows that
Pd0 = maxs;t
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}|
|{e ∈ E}|
=max
s;t
|A|
|A× B|
=
1
|B| :
To calculate Pd1 , we consider the number of solutions (ea; eb) to the set of equations
t = F(s+ ea) + eb; t′ = F(s′ + ea) + eb; (11)
where t; t′; s = s′ are @xed constants.
We claim that the number of solutions (ea; eb) to (11) is equal to the number of
solutions ea to the equation
t − t′ = F(s+ ea)− F(s′ + ea): (12)
It is straightforward to show that ( : (ea; eb) → ea is a one-to-one correspondence
from the set of solutions to (11) to that to (12). On the other hand, since F is perfect
nonlinear, the function F(s+ ea)− F(s′ + ea) is balanced. Hence
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e); t′ = f(s′; e)}| = |A||B|
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and
Pd1 = maxs;t
max
s′ =s;t′
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e); t′ = f(s′; e)}|
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}|
=max
s;t
max
s′ =s;t′
|A|=|B|
|A|
=
1
|B| :
The construction of systematic authentication codes described above is quite general.
As long as we have a perfect nonlinear mapping, Theorem 15 gives an authentication
code. When |A|= |B|, by Theorem 14 the authentication code of Theorem 15 is optimal.
3.2. The second kind of authentication codes from perfect nonlinear mappings
The following result follows from Theorem 15.
Theorem 16. Let F(x)=TrGF(pm)=GF(ph)(xs) be one of the perfect nonlinear mappings
of Lemma 5, where p is odd and h|m. Set (A;+)= (GF(pm);+) and (B;+)=
(GF(ph);+). Then for the authentication code (S;E;T; f) of (9), we have
|S| = pm; |E| = pm+h; |T| = ph
and Pd0 =Pd1 = 1=p
h.
When h=m, Theorem 16 gives three classes of optimal authentication codes corre-
sponding to the three perfect nonlinear mappings xs over GF(q) described in Lemma 4.
However, when h¡m the codes of Theorems 16 are not optimal with respect to the
second part of Stinson’s Bounds described in Theorem 14.
The following result follows from Theorem 15.
Theorem 17. Let F(x1; : : : ; xn)= x21 + x
2
2 + · · · + x2n over GF(q), where q is odd. Set
(A;+)= (GF(qn);+) and (B;+)= (GF(q);+). Then for the authentication code (S;E;
T; f) of (9), we have
|S| = qn; |E| = qn+1; |T| = q
and Pd0 =Pd1 = 1=q.
The following result follows from Theorem 15.
Theorem 18. Let F(x) be the perfect nonlinear mapping of Lemma 7 or 8. Set
(A;+)= (Zp2 ;+) and (B;+)= (Zp;+). Then for the authentication code (S;E;T; f)
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of (9), we have
|S| = p2; |E| = p3; |T| = p
and Pd0 =Pd1 = 1=p.
3.3. The second kind of authentication codes from almost perfect nonlinear
mappings
Let f be a function from an abelian group (A;+) to another one (B;+). f is called
almost perfect nonlinear when Pf =2=|B|. In many cases, almost perfect nonlinear
functions have optimal nonlinearity as 2=|B| is the minimum possible value a function
from A to B can take on. For example, this is the case when A=GF(2u) and B=GF(2v)
for some u and v.
Some known almost perfect nonlinear power functions xs from GF(2m) to GF(2m)
are the following:
• s=2m − 2 [1,21].
• s=2i+1 with gcd(i; m)= 1, where 16i6(m−1)=2 if m is odd and 16i6(m−2)=2
if m is even [21,12].
• s=22i−2i+1 with gcd(i; m)= 1, where 16i6(m−1)=2 if m is odd and 16i6(m−
2)=2 if m is even [18,16].
• s=2(m−1)=2 + 3, where m is odd [9].
• s=2(m−1)=2 + 2(m−1)=4 − 1, where m≡ 1 (mod 4) [10].
• s=2(m−1)=2 + 2(3m−1)=4 − 1, where m≡ 3 (mod 4) [10].
Some known almost perfect nonlinear power functions xs from GF(pm) to GF(pm),
where p is odd, are the following (due to Helleseth and Sandberg [14], and Helleseth
et al. [15]):
• s=pm − 2, where pm≡ 2 (mod 3) [15].
• s=(pm − 1)=2− 1, where p≡ 3; 7 (mod 20); pm¿7; pm =27, and m is odd [14].
• s=3, where p =3 [15].
• s=(pm + 1)=4 + (pm − 1)=2, where pm≡ 3 (mod 8) [15].
• s=(pm + 1)=4, where pm≡ 7 (mod 8) [15].
• s=pm − 3, where n¿1 is odd and p=3 [15].
• s=(2pm − 1)=3, where pm≡ 2 (mod 3) [15].
• s=pm=2 + 2, where p¿3 is prime and pm=2≡ 1 (mod 3) [15].
• s=p(m+1)=2 − 1, where m is odd and p=3 [15].
• s=(5k + 1)=2, where gcd(2m; k)= 1 and p=5 [15].
We have the following result on authentication codes obtained using almost perfect
nonlinear functions.
Theorem 19. Let F be an almost perfect nonlinear mapping from an abelian group
(A;+) to another one (B;+). Then for the authentication code of (9), the deception
probabilities are given by
Pd0 =
1
|B| and Pd1 =
2
|A| :
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Proof. Let s be a @xed constant, and consider f(s; e)=F(s + ea) + eb as a function
of e=(ea; eb). Clearly f(s; e) is balanced. Hence
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}| = |A| (13)
for each t∈T. It follows that
Pd0 = maxs;t
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}|
|{e ∈ E}| =
|A|
|A× B| =
1
|B| :
To calculate Pd1 , we consider the number of solutions (ea; eb) to the set of equations
t = F(s+ ea) + eb; t′ = F(s′ + ea) + eb; (14)
where t; t′; s = s′ are @xed constants.
We claim that the number of solutions (ea; eb) to (14) is equal to the number of
solutions ea to the equation
t − t′ = F(s+ ea)− F(s′ + ea): (15)
It is straightforward to show that ( : (ea; eb) → ea is a one-to-one correspondence from
the set of solutions to (14) to that of (15). On the other hand, since F is almost perfect
nonlinear, (15) has at most two solutions and has exactly two solutions for some @xed
s; s′; t, and t′. Hence
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e); t′ = f(s′; e)}|6 2
and
Pd1 = maxs;t
max
s′ =s;t′
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e); t′ = f(s′; e)}|
|{e ∈ E : t = f(s; e)}| =
2
|A| :
The construction of systematic authentication codes described in Theorem 19 is quite
general. As long as we have an almost perfect nonlinear mapping, Theorem 19 will
give a good authentication code.
As a consequence of Theorem 19, we have the following.
Theorem 20. Let F be an almost perfect nonlinear function from GF(pm) to itself,
where p is even or odd. Set (A;+)= (GF(pm);+) and (B;+)= (GF(pm);+). Then
for the authentication code (S;E;T; f) of (9), we have
|S| = pm; |E| = p2m; |T| = pm
and Pd0 = 1=p
m and Pd1 = 2=p
m.
Bierbrauer [2] constructed a code (S;E;T; f) with the following parameters
|S| = qs(1+qs−t); |E| = q2s+t ; |T| = qt
and with deception probabilities Pd0 = 1=q
t and Pd1 = 2=q
t , where s¿t. The code of
Theorem 20 is as good as Bierbrauer’s code for the case s= t. Also each almost perfect
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nonlinear function listed at the beginning of this section can be used to construct an
authentication code with properties given by Theorem 20.
4. Concluding remarks
As shown, some of the authentication codes presented here are optimal, and some are
as good as Bierbrauer’s codes. The codes presented in this paper have the properties that
|S|= |E| for the codes presented in Section 2, and |E|= c|S| for the codes presented
in Section 3, where c is some constant. The parameters of optimal codes must have
some special relations which put restrictions on their Kexibility. It is well known that
optimal authentication codes correspond to certain combinatorial designs with special
parameters, [19,29,30]. It is impossible to achieve both optimality and the Kexibility of
parameters at the same time. The codes presented in this paper are designed to achieve
optimality or almost optimality with a small sacri@ce on the Kexibility of parameters.
Authentication codes with more Kexible parameters may be found in the work by Xing
et al. [31].
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